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Dignity and Second Amendment 
Enforcement—Response to 
William D. Araiza’s, Arming the Second 
Amendment and Enforcing the 
Fourteenth 
Darrell A.H. Miller* 
Abstract 
 
William Araiza’s insightful article, Arming the Second 
Amendment, has one essential, hidden component: dignity. Dignity 
helps explain the peculiar hydraulics of Congress’s power to enforce 
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment—a jurisprudence in 
which the less scrutiny the Court itself applies to a given class or 
right, the more scrutiny it applies to congressional efforts to protect 
that same class or right. Dignity helps explain the Court’s halting 
approach to Reconstruction Amendment enforcement power more 
generally – an approach in which constitutional versus 
unconstitutional legislation turns on seemingly insignificant 
regulatory distinctions. And dignity’s role in § 5 enforcement helps 
explain the efforts of gun rights advocates to portray themselves as 
disempowered and despised members of a subordinate class. Araiza 
has cogently broken down the complicated mechanics of the Court’s 
equal protection, substantive rights, and § 5 enforcement power 
jurisprudence, but it is notions of dignity that seems to drive this 
particular constitutional engine. 
 
                                                                                                     
 * Melvin G. Shimm Professor of Law, Duke Law School. Thanks to Joseph 
Blocher and Neil Siegel for discussing this project with me. 
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I. Introduction 
William Araiza’s wonderfully insightful article, Arming the 
Second Amendment, has one essential, hidden component: dignity. 
Dignity helps explain the peculiar hydraulics of Section 5 
enforcement power—a jurisprudence in which the less scrutiny the 
Court itself applies to a given class or right, the more scrutiny it 
applies to congressional efforts to protect that same class or right. 
Dignity helps explain the Court’s halting approach to 
Reconstruction Amendment enforcement power more generally, an 
approach in which constitutional versus unconstitutional 
legislation turns on seemingly insignificant regulatory 
distinctions. And dignity helps explain the efforts of gun rights 
advocates to portray themselves as disempowered and despised 
members of a subordinate class. Araiza has cogently broken down 
the complicated mechanics of the Court’s equal protection, 
substantive rights, and Section 5 enforcement power 
jurisprudence, but it is the flywheel—dignity—that seems to drive 
this particular constitutional engine. 
Part II of this essay recaps Professor Araiza’s useful analysis 
of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms and its 
relationship to Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
power. For the most part, I think his analysis is correct, although 
this is an area of many paradoxes; and, to his credit, Araiza doesn’t 
try to resolve them all. Part III identifies the way dignity—
between courts and Congress, between Congress and the states, 
and between rights claimants and the states—explains the 
tensions within the Court’s Enforcement Clause jurisprudence. 
Part IV offers some concluding thoughts on how humility—the 
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cousin of dignity—may support the soft normative proposals 
Professor Araiza supplies near the end of his piece.   
II. Second Amendment Rights and the Hydraulics of § 5 
Enforcement 
A decade ago this year, in District of Columbia v. Heller,1 the 
Supreme Court first held that the Second Amendment protects a 
right to keep and bear arms unrelated to participation in an 
organized militia. Since that time, lower courts have scrambled to 
make the “Delphic”2 pronouncements in Heller work as practical 
law. They have converged on what is generally described as the 
“two part test:”3 a decision-making device that performs the 
essential function of sorting issues between the constitutional and 
non-constitutional (the “coverage” question); and the 
constitutionally compliant from the unconstitutional (the 
“protection” question). 
For example, using a gun to rob a bank is a non-constitutional 
issue under the Second Amendment in the same way that uttering 
the words “your money or your life” in the same circumstances is a 
non-constitutional issue under the First Amendment.4 There is no 
standard of scrutiny to be applied; no constitutional issue to decide 
with these facts. The Constitution simply “does not show up” in 
these cases.5 By contrast, a regulation that requires firearms to be 
                                                                                                     
 1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 2. See Nelson Lund, No Conservative Consensus Yet: Douglas Ginsburg, 
Brett Kavanaugh, and Diane Sykes on the Second Amendment, ENGAGE: J. 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS, July 2012, at 24 (“The real problem is that Heller 
is so Delphic, or muddled, that the kind of methodological debate found in 
Heller II is unresolvable.”). 
 3. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 
& Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (“A two-step inquiry has emerged 
as the prevailing approach.”). 
 4. See Glenn Harland Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 
62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 478 (1995) (“Just as the demand ‘your money or your life’ is 
not protected by the First Amendment, so the right to arms is not without limits.”) 
 5. See Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What is Gun Control?  Direct 
Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 
U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 296 (2016) (quoting Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the 
First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
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kept out of the reach of children may well raise a Second 
Amendment coverage issue, and yet may still be constitutional 
because the government has supplied sufficient justification for the 
regulation. Almost uniformly, the lower courts have employed 
some version of means-end scrutiny to perform this protection 
inquiry.6 Usually the scrutiny is intermediate, but occasionally it 
is strict.  
Although some judges have spurned the second portion of this 
test as illegitimate7—and although some successful as-applied 
challenges have blurred the lines separating the first and the 
second steps8—the two part test still represents the predominant 
mode of reasoning in the lower courts.  
Professor Araiza’s bold move is to suggest that this two part 
test is too crude a description of actual judicial practice.9  The test 
actually is composed of five parts and applies almost 
algorithmically. The refined test progresses as follows: 
(1) determine if there is even a Second Amendment issue; 
(2) evaluate how much of a burden the regulation places on the 
Second Amendment; (3) determine how close to the “core” of the 
Second Amendment the regulation touches; (4) choose a level of 
scrutiny based on proximity to the core; (5) apply a level of scrutiny 
(typically intermediate), with reference to the importance of the 
government interest, the relationship between those interests, and 
the regulation.10   
I have a few quibbles with Professor Araiza’s explanation of 
the doctrine, not so much with its descriptive accuracy as with its 
analytical utility. First, I am not certain how distinct some of these 
steps are from each other. For example, it is not at all clear how 
much an inquiry into the “burden” on the right differs from an 
                                                                                                     
 6. See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc., 700 F.3d at 194. 
 7. Houston v. City of New Orleans, 675 F.3d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 2012) (Elrod, 
J., dissenting), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g by 682 F.3d 361 (5th 
Cir. 2012); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1280–81 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 8. Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 356–57 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017). 
 9. For additional empirical work on this topic, see Eric Ruben & Joseph 
Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right to Keep and 
Bear Arms after Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1452–53, 1507 (2018). 
 10. William D. Araiza, Arming the Second Amendment—and Enforcing the 
Fourteenth, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1801, 1843–45 (2017). 
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inquiry into the “core” versus “periphery” of the right. Courts 
appear apt to merge these steps when they benchmark burdens or 
cores at an unhelpful level of abstraction as, for example, 
describing the right as “self-defense.”11 Further, as Justice Breyer 
predicted in his Heller dissent, courts nearly always stipulate the 
government’s interest in protecting citizens from gun violence as 
compelling or important.12 Hence, the level of scrutiny typically 
turns on matters of fit, rather than on evaluations of the 
seriousness, or even genuineness of the government interest. I do 
not think courts have agreed on what, if any, distinction there is to 
be made between a “historical” versus a “longstanding” regulation. 
Not only does this distinction raise further issues about the 
relevant level of abstraction;13 the two formulations could be 
discontinuous. Consider prohibitions on loaded guns in checked 
luggage, which has been the law since the late 1960s.  It is perfectly 
possible that a court could find the regulation has no historical 
parallel (no airplanes in 1791), but could still be longstanding (it 
has been the law for nearly half a century). These are a few 
examples of my doubts about the analytical utility of the five-factor 
test.  Although, again, I agree with Professor Araiza’s descriptive 
point that all of these approaches appear in the lower courts to 
various degrees.  
The gravamen of Professor Araiza’s article, though, is not 
about Second Amendment doctrine itself, but its relationship to 
congressional enforcement power. His argument is that the 
muddled nature of Second Amendment doctrine after Heller—with 
its talk of cores and peripheries, its agnosticism concerning tiers of 
scrutiny, and its imprecise measures of history and longevity—
complicates how a Court is supposed to evaluate Section 5 
enforcement legislation after City of Boerne v. Flores.14   
That enforcement jurisprudence is complex. Depending on the 
rights or persons Congress aims to protect, the Court’s review of 
                                                                                                     
 11. Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F.Supp.3d 124, 143 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 12. Heller, 554 U.S. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 13. For example, some bans on possession of firearms by felons and certain 
misdemeanants are upheld because of a general historical prohibition on gun 
ownership by the “unvirtuous.” Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second 
Amendment Limitations and Criminological Considerations, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 
1339, 1360 (2009). 
 14. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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legislation can be either deferential or exacting. Professor Araiza 
does an excellent job of pulling apart the different components of 
the Court’s Enforcement Clause jurisprudence and he mounts a 
heroic effort to systematize it. In general, the doctrine works 
hydraulically:  the less scrutiny the Court itself provides the 
subject right or classification, the more it will scrutinize Congress’s 
power to enforce those rights or classifications.   
For instance, in Boerne the Court concluded that Congress 
exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers in 
passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).15 RFRA 
required courts to apply a higher standard of scrutiny to free 
exercise claims than the Court itself was willing to employ, and 
Congress had not demonstrated to the Court’s satisfaction such 
widespread “religious bigotry” as to necessitate such a deviation 
from the Court’s doctrine.16 Consequently, RFRA was not 
sufficiently “congruent and proportional” to be a legal exercise of 
Congress’s Section 5 power.17 By contrast, in Nevada Department 
of Human Resources v. Hibbs,18 the Court was less skeptical of 
congressional evidence of sex discrimination in family medical 
leave policy, presumably because the Court itself accords sex 
discrimination a higher standard of scrutiny. Hence, the Family 
and Medical Leave Act’s19 abrogation of state sovereign immunity 
was a “congruent and proportional” exercise of Congress’s 
Section 5 power. My description of the hydraulics of court 
enforcement versus congressional enforcement of constitutional 
rights is, of course, a simplification. Professor Araiza’s article 
identifies the workings with much more nuance, and is not blind 
to some of the paradoxes: sex discrimination garners 
“intermediate” scrutiny from the Court, but in fact, that scrutiny 
looks something more like strict scrutiny, or, perhaps 
                                                                                                     
 15. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub L. No. 103-141, 1993 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507 (1997). 
 16. Flores, 521 U.S. at 530. 
 17. Id. at 533 (“The stringent test RFRA demands of state laws reflects a 
lack of proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the 
legitimate ends to be achieved.”). 
 18. 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2012). 
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“intermediate scrutiny with bite.”20 Gender-neutral legislation to 
prevent sex discrimination when taking leave from work is 
constitutional when one takes leave to care for others but not when 
one takes leave to care for oneself.21   
Professor Araiza leaves other paradoxes unmentioned. Chief 
among them is the relationship between the “congruence and 
proportionality” test and Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity. The employment provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act22 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act23 
lack “congruence and proportionality” when Congress attempts to 
break through the barrier of Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity. But when a person sues an individual officer for 
prospective injunctive relief under the very same statutes, 
“congruence and proportionality” never enters the picture.24 
Similarly, it’s beyond dispute that subdivisions of states—counties, 
municipalities, school districts, townships—do not enjoy sovereign 
immunity.25 Which raises a huge unanswered question: City of 
Boerne involved the city of Boerne, so why was the Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement power even relevant?26 
Admittedly, these paradoxes are outside the scope of Professor 
Araiza’s project. His primary observation is simple but important: 
the less clearly the Court articulates a Second Amendment 
standard using traditional doctrinal methods, the less clear is the 
constitutionality of congressional efforts to enforce the Second 
Amendment using Section 5. This ambiguity, which Professor 
                                                                                                     
 20. Brent L. Caslin, Gender Classifications and United States v. Virginia:  
Muddying the Waters of Equal Protection, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 1353, 1395 n.359 
(1997).) 
 21. Araiza, supra note 10, at 1832–35. 
 22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2012). 
 23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2012). 
 24. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 
(2001). 
 25. See id. at 369 (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not extend its immunity 
to units of local government. These entities are subject to private claims for 
damages under the ADA without Congress’ ever having to rely on § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to render them so.” (citing Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 
U.S. 529, 530 (1890))). 
 26. Cf. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) 
(providing that municipalities are not automatically immune from liability under 
the Sherman Antitrust Act).  
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Araiza attempts to resolve, has practical consequences. If Congress 
were to pursue legislation like concealed carry reciprocity—and 
especially if it wanted to create a private right of action to enforce 
such legislation—it would have to anticipate how the Court would 
apply Boerne and its progeny, and, correspondingly, what kind of 
record it would need to assemble in anticipation of such a 
challenge.27 
III. Dignity and the Enforcement Power 
Professor Araiza’s contribution to this area is welcome and 
illuminating. He has done a great service in describing the nuance 
of the Second Amendment test, in disassembling the enforcement 
clause jurisprudence, and in thinking through its application 
through a developing right to keep and bear arms. But I wonder if 
his analysis wouldn’t have been helped by attention to an 
additional factor—dignity—which seems to drive so much of this 
area of law.  
Dignity, or rather, competing notions of dignity, seems to 
explain many of the conflicting judgments in these cases. First, 
there are competing dignitary interests between the Court and 
Congress. Congress enacted RFRA under a Warren Court-era 
assumption that Congress was a co-equal (or at least a junior) 
partner in specifying and channeling constitutional norms. The 
Court’s sharp rebuke of Congress in Boerne manifested its sense 
that Congress had drifted out of its lane, and that expansion of 
congressional enforcement power represented a diminution in its 
own constitutional prestige to “say what the law is.”28   
Then there are the competing dignitary interests between 
Congress as constitutional enforcer and the sovereignty of the 
states. The Court relied on notions of dignity in Shelby County v. 
Holder,29 concluding that the Voting Rights Act’s formula for pre-
clearance, which treated different states differently based on their 
prior history of voting rights violations, violated the “equal 
sovereignty” principle of the Constitution, which accords every 
                                                                                                     
 27. See Araiza, supra note 10, at 1867–68. 
 28. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535.   
 29. 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
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state “equal . . . power, dignity and authority.”30 Similarly, much of 
the federalism jurisprudence of last thirty years—often 
surrounding the Eleventh Amendment—rests on the notion that it 
is an affront to the dignity of states as sovereigns for Congress to 
subject them to private lawsuit without their consent.31 The 
dignitary protections of sovereign immunity further curb 
congressional aspirations already diminished by Boerne.32 Indeed, 
it seems that dignity of the state is the only coherent justification 
for these cases: given that sovereign immunity extends far beyond 
the actual terms of the Eleventh Amendment,33 given that no 
political subdivision of a state shares the state’s sovereign 
immunity,34 and given that no individual officer of the state even if 
indemnified by the state shares in the same immunity.35   
Finally, there are the competing dignitary interests between 
individual rights claimants and the states.  Tennessee v. Lane’s36 
holding that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act validly 
abrogates sovereign immunity is difficult understand without the 
corollary that an alternative holding would have forced a disabled 
individual to literally crawl up the steps of the courthouse to seek 
justice. As Justice Ginsburg said in her concurrence, “[l]egislation 
calling upon all government actors to respect the dignity of 
                                                                                                     
 30. Id. at 544 (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)). For more, see 
Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 175 (2013).  
 31. See Fed. Mar. Com’n v. S.C. State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743, 760 
(2002) (“The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States 
the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.”); Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999) (“Private suits against nonconsenting States, 
however, present ‘the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of 
judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties,’ regardless of the forum.” 
(quoting In re Ayres, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).  
 32. For more work in this area, see generally Evan H. Caminker, Judicial 
Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 ANNALS OF AM. ACADEMY OF POL. SCI. 81 (2001) 
and Julie Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the 
Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV.  1921 (2003).  
 33. Alden, 527 U.S. at 706. 
 34. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890). 
 35. See Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1293–94 (2017) (“[I]ndemnification 
provisions do not implicate one of the underlying rationales for state sovereign 
immunity—a government’s ability to make its own decisions about the allocation 
of scarce resources.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Caminker 
makes a similar point. Caminker, supra note 32, at 84. 
 36. 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
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individuals with disabilities is entirely compatible with our 
Constitution’s commitment to federalism, properly conceived.”37 
Dignity appeared prominently in Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges.38 And, unsurprisingly, the concept 
of dignity featured in the arguments and ultimate opinion about 
the relative rights of cake bakers and homosexual couples the 
recent Masterpiece Cakeshop case.39 
As dignity does so much work, it is no surprise that gun rights 
supporters appeal to notions of dignity frequently in their public 
statements and briefs. Gun rights organizations have continually 
portrayed gun owners as a despised and vulnerable minority, in 
need of protection by the judiciary. Sometimes they argue that gun 
violence prevention measures are not based on reasonable policy 
metrics but motivated by anti-gun “bigotry.”40 (The premise here 
seems to be if the regulation is over- or under-inclusive, then the 
only reason for the regulation must be some type of animus.) Their 
arguments appear in official briefing papers: lower courts are 
engaging in “massive resistance” to gun rights, the Second 
Amendment is being treated as “second-class.”41 The rhetoric—to 
the extent it persuades some judges, Justices, and political 
actors—perfectly advances the goals of gun rights advocates. They 
are able to frame gun rights supporters as victims of a political 
process failure, deserving of special protection by judicial actors, 
                                                                                                     
 37. A similar reasoning applies to the unanimous court’s decision in United 
States v. Georgia, that Congress may use its section five power under the ADA in 
an Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment case, given 
the indignity that a state had left a paraplegic prisoner in a cramped cell to sit in 
his own waste. 546 U.S. 151 (2006). 
 38. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (explaining that 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of “liberties extend to certain personal 
choices central to individual dignity and autonomy”). 
 39. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 
16-111, 2018 WL 2465172, at *3, 7 (U.S. June 4, 2018); Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 28, 29, 100, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-111). 
 40. David B. Kopel, The First Amendment Guide to the Second Amendment, 
81 TENN. L. REV. 417, 462 (2014). 
 41. See Darrell A.H. Miller, The Second Amendment and Second-Class 
Rights, HARVARD LAW REVIEW BLOG (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/the-second-amendment-and-second-class-
rights/ (last visited May 12, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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and, should the judicial branch fail, they help cultivate a friendly 
record for any prophylactic Section 5 measure Congress may 
enact.42 
IV. Humility and the Enforcement Power 
But dignity is not the only value at play in Second and 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement going forward. There is also 
humility: the recognition that human beings are fallible, that their 
judgments sometimes have unintended consequences, and that 
certain institutions may be better positioned to make decisions 
than others. To this extent, my instincts are not that different from 
Professor Araiza’s. Like Professor Araiza, I agree that legislatures 
are in a better institutional position to weigh the costs and benefits 
of most firearm policies. And, also like him, I agree that Congress 
also has a better position to channel the moral and constitutional 
sentiments of the nation.43 On this score, the humility courts 
should employ is not the faux one so often rehearsed in judicial 
confirmation hearings, but something more of the kind suggested 
by Adrian Vermeule (at least where Congress has decided to act).44 
This kind of humility would not lead to predictable results. The 
same kind of deference to legislative judgments about the need to 
restrict certain kinds of firearms would operate with respect to 
legislative judgments about the need to protect Second 
Amendment rights by allowing firearms to travel across state 
lines. This is not to say that other constitutional considerations are 
irrelevant.45 It is just to say that, as between believing and not 
                                                                                                     
 42. Furthermore, to the extent that Second Amendment rights are treated 
as indistinguishable from self-defense rights, self-defense doctrine sometimes is 
explained by reference to notions of dignity.  See generally Margaret Raymond, 
Looking for Trouble: Framing and the Dignitary Interest in the Law of Self-
Defense, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 287 (2010). 
 43. See Araiza, supra note 10, at 1880 (remarking on Congress’s “capacity 
for empirical investigation” and its “authority to speak for the values of the 
American people”).  
 44. Adriane Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of 
Reason, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1507 (2007). 
 45. For example, it is undeniable that the more protective Congress or the 
states become with respect to firearm ownership, the more the protective laws 
will conflict with other, equally important constitutional values. See 
Wollschlaeger v. Gov. of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) (striking down 
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believing Congress when it says that some kind of prophylactic 
legislation is needed, courts should pay Congress the respect it is 
due as an independent constitutional actor empowered by the 
Reconstruction Amendments.46   
                                                                                                     
portions of the Florida’s Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act (FOPA)—the so-called 
“Docks v. Glocks” law—on First Amendment grounds).  
 46. For more on this, see Darrell A.H. Miller, The Thirteenth Amendment 
and the Regulation of Custom, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1811, 1852–53 (2011) 
(discussing Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power). 
